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Abstract. Future automotive systems will exhibit increased levels of automation
as well as ever tighter integration with other vehicles, traﬃc infrastructure, and
cloud services. From safety perspective, this can be perceived as boon or bane -
it greatly increases complexity and uncertainty, but at the same time opens up
new opportunities for realizing innovative safety functions. Moreover, cyberse
curity becomes important as additional concern because attacks are now much
more likely and severe. Unfortunately, there is lack of experience with security
concerns in context of safety engineering in general and in automotive safety
departments in particular. To remediate this problem, we propose a systematic
pattern-based approach that interlinks safety and security patterns and provides
guidance with respect to selection and combination of both types of patterns in
context of system engineering. The application of a combined safety and security
pattern engineering workﬂow is shown and demonstrated by an automotive use
case scenario.
Keywords: ISO 26262 · SAE J3061 · Engineering workﬂow · Safety pattern ·
Security pattern · Automotive
1 Introduction
Future applications in the automotive domain will be highly connected. They will rely
on interacting functionalities exchanging data via various networking channels, and
storing or receiving their operational data in or from the cloud. On the one hand, there
is enormous potential in these new types of cyber-physical-system (CPS) applications
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and services, which are bound to revolutionize the automotive domain, as we know it
today. On the other hand, ensuring safety and security of next-generation automotive
systems is a signiﬁcant and comprehensive challenge that needs to be addressed before
promising visions can become reality and an economic and societal success story.
Today, practitioners in the automotive domain are well experienced to deal with
safety aspects during CPS development. However, there is a lack of knowledge on how
to handle related security aspects, because the knowledge is either just non-existent or,
maybe even more often, distributed over diﬀerent organizational units in a company and
thus not easily accessible.
Given the tight interconnection and the mutual impact of safety and security aspects,
we argue that there is a need for a combined engineering approach enabling safety and
security co-engineering. Moreover, given the present lack of experience in safety and
security co-engineering, we think that providing additional guidance to engineers would
be highly beneﬁcial.
In this paper, we speciﬁcally focus on the proper and due consideration of the security
aspect within a safety engineering lifecycle, which is one particularly urgent problem
related to the aforementioned challenge. Consequently, we propose a systematic pattern-
based and ISO 26262-oriented approach for safety and security co-engineering in the
automotive domain. Through the use of patterns, we hope to close the security knowl
edge gap by harvesting its manifold beneﬁts: conservation and reuse of design knowl
edge, best practices and tested solutions, reuse of architectural artifacts enabled by
abstraction, cross-domain exchange of solution concepts, etc. Apart from the systematic
interlinking of safety and security patterns, we elaborate how these patterns can be
speciﬁed and maintained.
2 Background and Related Work
This section provides background knowledge about architectural patterns in general,
safety patterns, security patterns, safety and security co-engineering, and current rele
vant automotive guidance for safety and cybersecurity.
2.1 Relevant Automotive Guidance for Safety and Cybersecurity
ISO 26262 – “Road Vehicles – Functional Safety” [1] is an automotive domain-
specific safety standard. It provides a structured and generic approach for the
complete safety lifecycle of an automotive E/E system including design, develop
ment, production, service processes, and decommissioning. ISO 26262 recommends
requirements and techniques for system, software, and hardware design to achieve
functional safety of E/E systems. For instance, the Usage of established design
patterns is recommended (i.e. “+”) for all ASIL levels for each sub-phase of soft
ware development, as described in Subsect. 4.4.7 of Part 6. Concerning security, the
first edition, released in 2011, does not consider it explicitly neither there is any
support or guidance. The second edition, to be released mid-2018, is expected to
provide some notes regarding the interaction of safety and security activities.
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SAE J3061 [10] is a cybersecurity process framework for the development lifecycle
of in-car systems. It provides guidance on best practice methods and techniques for
secure system development tailored to the automotive domain by using a corresponding
V model, as deﬁned in ISO 26262. In J3061, safety and security interaction points are
deﬁned to coordinate the two engineering processes.
2.2 Safety and Security Co-analysis and Co-engineering
In our view, safety & security co-analysis refers to methods and techniques that can be
used to identify safety hazards and security threats. Safety & security co-engineering
refers to engineering activities that consider both safety and security and their interac
tions in the development lifecycle. Co-analysis includes activities in the early stage of
the development lifecycle, e.g. in the requirements engineering as well as the design
phase. Co-engineering considers all phases of the lifecycle, in which co-analysis is an
integral part.
In the context of automotive domain, existing co-analysis methods Hazard Anal
ysis and Risk Management (HARA) is standardized in ISO 26262 for safety, which
can be extended with security Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA)
method, as mentioned in SAE J3061 to identify cybersecurity risks [15]. Other
proposals include Failure mode and Vulnerability Effect Analysis (FMVEA) [4] and
Security Aware Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment (SAHARA) [16] that aim at
combining both safety and security analysis in parallel. A safety and security co-
engineering approach should include all engineering activities in the automotive
system development lifecycle according to relevant standards such as ISO 26262 and
SAE J3061 based on the V-model [17].
2.3 Architectural Patterns
Patterns are used to solve similar problems with a general and universal solution. A well-
known and proven solution for a speciﬁc problem is generalized so that it can be reused
for similar recurring problems in other projects. Alexander describes the concept of
using architecture patterns to solve similar problems in diﬀerent projects [9].
The concept of patterns is used in many diﬀerent domains including hardware and
software. A good and very well-known reference is the book by Gamma et al. [11] (also
known as the Gang of Four), which had a signiﬁcant impact on making the pattern
approach popular for software development. The book includes some general back
ground and concepts as well as a collection of concrete patterns for object-oriented
software design.
The state-of-the-art provides a few dozen safety architecture patterns [2, 3], with
some being just a variation of simpler ones. Armoush introduced in his PhD thesis [3]
new safety patterns and provides a collection of existing safety patterns and a charac
terization of the main pattern representation attributes for embedded systems patterns
(e.g. Name, Type, ID, Abstract, Context, Problem, Structure,…). These patterns are
mostly based on the work of Douglas [12, 13] for hardware patterns and on Pullum [14]
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for software fault tolerance techniques brought into pattern notation for software
patterns.
Safety patterns usually include some kind of hardware redundancy, multiple chan
nels with voters, or sanity checks [2]. They can address software or hardware issues and
they allow systems to remain fully functional or to bring them to a safe state. Describing
existing patterns, but the ones used in the presented case study, is out of the scope of
this work.
Security engineering is an iterative and incremental process. Security patterns can
be seen as the essence of sound security designs and best practices from an existing body
of knowledge that can be used to solve security problems in new scenarios. During the
security engineering process, security patterns can be used in requirements analysis and
design to eliminate security ﬂaws and provide additional information for security vali
dation. Security patterns have attracted the attention of both academic researchers and
industry [5]. The main focus of existing work is on the construction (including repre
sentation, classiﬁcation, and organization) and application of security patterns. Security
patterns are represented as textual templates or combined with UML models, in a hier
archically layered architecture or in a searchable pattern library. Security patterns have
been proposed for requirements engineering, software system design such as web serv
ices, and Service-Oriented Architectures [6]. Open Security Architecture1 is a
community-based online repository of security control patterns based on the ISO 27000
information security standard family for enterprise IT systems, in which patterns are
represented as text and graphical architecture designs in a consistent template. In recent
years, security patterns have also been proposed for cyber-physical systems [7].
3 Methodology
Although patterns address speciﬁc problems, the context in which a pattern is applied
inﬂuences how it should be applied. Therefore, more than a catalogue of patterns, prac
titioners require a workﬂow to systematically guide their eﬀorts when using patterns to
tackle safety and security problems. We propose a safety and security pattern engi
neering lifecycle that aims at combining the two engineering processes for pattern iden
tiﬁcation and design and allows for the necessary interaction and balancing of safety
and security concerns.
3.1 Pattern Engineering Lifecycle
The Pattern Engineering Lifecycle is the approach proposed in this paper to help engi
neers selecting and applying safety and security patterns to develop safe and secure
systems. The Pattern Engineering Lifecycle is meant to be used in unison (and tightly
integrated) with the usual safety and security engineering approaches. It therefore does
not substitute established approaches but rather enhances them with further tasks. The
approach is suitable to be used with all existing patterns as well as ones to be developed.
1
http://www.opensecurityarchitecture.org.
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The lifecycle takes place at the end of the Product Development: System level phase
of the V-Model framework of ISO 26262 [1]. At this point, the Functional and Technical
Concept are fully developed and both are used as input for the lifecycle. The output of
the lifecycle is then consumed by the next phases of the V-Model, namely Product
Development: Hardware level and Software level.
The lifecycle is divided into three main phases happening one after the other in a
waterfall fashion (cf. Fig. 1). The ﬁrst phase, Safety Pattern Engineering, comes before
Security Pattern Engineering, the second phase. The rationale for this is that the approach
explicitly focuses on “security for safety” (i.e., safety concerns are the main engineering
drivers) and that security should start working when the ﬁnal architecture is almost
ﬁnished. Also, in general, further changes in the architecture might open new vulnera
bility points or might not be properly covered by mechanisms already implemented.
However, security measures can inﬂuence system properties that can alter safety. For
this reason, we introduce the Safety and Security Co-Engineering Loop, the third phase
of the lifecycle. The loop prevents safety-motivated changes from creating unforeseen
vulnerabilities and security-motivated changes from jeopardizing safety characteristics
of the system. Each of these phases will be described in detail in the next paragraphs.
Fig. 1. Pattern engineering lifecycle
Safety Pattern Engineering. Safety Pattern Engineering involves safety-related tasks
and is composed of three main tasks (cf. Fig. 2), which will be described in the following
paragraphs.
Fig. 2. Safety pattern engineering and security pattern engineering tasks
Perform Safety Engineering. As described above, patterns are used to tackle speciﬁc
problems; therefore, we need to have a good understanding of the system and the context
in order to select and apply patterns appropriately. The workﬂow starts with established
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safety engineering approaches and techniques that need to be carried out until Safety
Requirements (Functional or Technical) are available.
Select Safety Pattern. The decision about which pattern best ﬁts a speciﬁc system
should be analyzed taking into account the problem to be addressed and the context of
the system. Besides, there are a few trade-oﬀs that one needs to take into consideration
when choosing an architectural pattern, such as costs (hardware, development eﬀort) or
standardization. The Safety Requirements guide safety engineers into selecting a safety.
Current state-of-the-art [3, 12, 13] provides many patterns with detailed information
about the impact in the system in the view of diﬀerent dimensions (e.g. Cost, Reliability,
Safety). There might be cases that no pattern is suitable for the discovered problems,
thus the engineer needs to come up with an ad-hoc solution.
Apply/Instantiate Safety Pattern. The engineers should apply the safety pattern to the
architecture, performing required changes on the architecture or on the pattern. Using
the pattern “as-is” is usually not possible and some adaptation might be required. The
updated system architecture is the prerequisite for the next task.
Security Pattern Engineering. In the previous phase, the architecture was updated
with safety measures. In the second phase, Security Pattern Engineering, the architecture
will be analyzed with regard to security vulnerabilities. The weak points are to be
addressed by applicable security patterns and a secure architecture will be the output of
this phase.
Perform Security Engineering. In this step, Security Engineering is performed on the
existing system context such as functional requirements, results of Safety Engineering,
and intermediate architectural design of the system, including the safety patterns. Estab
lished Security Engineering methods and techniques such as attack surface analysis,
attack trees, and threat modeling can be used to identify vulnerabilities and threats. The
results of this task leads to security measures that either mitigate potential threats or
reduce the risks to an acceptable level. Special attention is given to vulnerabilities caused
by safety patterns.
Select Security Pattern. The security engineers should give priority to the selection of
re-usable security solutions from well-established security patterns for mitigating the
security risks. If multiple security patterns are available, the selection of a security
pattern is then a design decision that optimizes cost-beneﬁt. Similar to the selection of
safety patterns, if no security pattern is available, an ad-hoc solution is applied.
Apply/Instantiate Security Pattern. In this step, the instantiated security pattern is
incorporated into the existing system architecture design. If the information how to
integrate is not available in the pattern description, the security engineers should adapt
the security pattern to the speciﬁc system context and requirements.
Safety and Security Co-engineering Loop. After the initial two phases of the Pattern
Engineering Lifecycle, the Safety and Security Co-Engineering Loop starts. In this
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phase, lightweight versions of safety pattern engineering and security pattern engi
neering take place one after the other until no extra modiﬁcation is required in the archi
tecture. The fact that they are performed as a lightweight version means that the focus
is on checking those aspects that experienced alteration and their respective inﬂuence
on the overall system.
The Loop starts with the safety pattern engineering task requiring safety engineers
to analyze how the newly added security patterns might impact the system safety. Some
security architecture strategy might impair, for example, the communication time
between components, causing a command to arrive late. Also in this task, the results of
the ﬁrst security pattern engineering phase help the safety engineers to identify further
points of failure that could be caused by an attack. The initial safety pattern might require
some modiﬁcation to add extra safety.
On the other hand, if the newly proposed safety mechanisms imply new vulnerabil
ities or changes in the attack surface, the security engineers should detect, assess, and
propose new solutions. This is what happens during the security pattern engineering
performed in the lightweight version. This goes on like a cycle and stops when the system
fulﬁlls the desired safety and security requirements. Updating supporting documentation
and updating the architecture are also tasks to be performed.
4 Implementation of Pattern Engineering Approach
In the following section, the technical implementation of the approach shall be demon
strated on an automotive case study.
4.1 Use Case Description
Our automotive use case example of a connected electriﬁed hybrid powertrain is a
combination of one or more electric motor(s) and a conventional internal combustion
engine, which is currently the most common variant of hybrid powertrains. The variety
of powertrain conﬁguration options increases the complexity of the powertrain itself as
well as the required control systems, which include software functions and electronic
control units. With the integration of connectivity features, further novel vehicle func
tionalities and new business models can be discovered. Therefore, we focus on an inte
gral part of every connected hybrid powertrain, the battery management system (BMS),
and its functionalities related to the connection to the external world; in this case espe
cially the connections with the charging unit.
In this paper, we investigate a speciﬁc use case scenario of the connected hybrid
powertrain use case: charging of the battery system by connecting it with an external
charging unit. Figure 3 left shows the most relevant elements: battery satellite modules,
battery management system, CAN communication, the charging interface, and the
external charging unit.
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Fig. 3. Left: Automotive Battery Use Case, Right: Architecture with the safety pattern applied
4.2 Application of the Approach
In this subsection, we apply the Pattern Engineering Lifecycle in the use case scenario
presented in the previous subsection. The concept phase is considered in this example.
4.2.1 Safety Pattern Engineering
Perform Safety Engineering. We describe in the following a small summary of the
results of this task up to the level of Functional Safety Requirements:
Hazard: Wrong estimation of charging status.
Comment: The battery of electric vehicles can be very dangerous in case of over
charging, even causing explosions. If the charging status of a battery is estimated
wrongly, extra energy might be supplied, leading to a hazardous situation.
Operational situation: Parking
Comment: The hazard will only happen while charging, and this can only be
performed while the car is parked. This hazard might also occur while driving when
architectures with regenerative systems are considered.
Hazard classiﬁcation:
• Severity: 3 || Exposure of frequency: 4 || Controllability: 2
• Resulting hazard ASIL: [C]
• Safety goal: Estimate correct status of cycle while charging.
– Safe state: Disconnect HV battery, Alert driver.
• Functional Safety requirement: Detect Failure and errors from BMS.
Select Safety Pattern. The results from Safety Engineering describe two possible safe
states for the system that are compliant with the Safety goal. The “Disconnect HV
battery” measure would cut oﬀ the power supply, the source of the hazard. The “Alert
driver” measure would issue a warning to the driver. The car will be in parking mode if
the hazard occurs (operational situation: Parking); therefore, full functionality in case
of fault occurrence is not required.
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We should apply to the architecture a pattern that helps fulﬁlling the Functional
Safety Requirement “Detect Failure and errors from BMS”. We selected the Monitor-
Actuator Pattern [12] (cf. Fig. 3 Right) which provides heterogeneous redundancy. This
pattern adds to the architecture a monitoring channel that detects possible faults and
triggers the primary channel to enter its fail-safe state. The Monitor-Actuator Pattern is
suitable to systems with low availability requirements and addresses the problem of
ﬁnding an appropriate mechanism for detecting failures or errors without incurring
higher costs.
Apply/Instantiate Safety Pattern. The Monitor-Actuator Pattern was instantiated as
depicted in Fig. 3. Only changes to the BMS component were made.
4.2.2 Security Pattern Engineering
Perform Security Engineering. In this context, Security Engineering follows the initial
deﬁnition of a safety pattern to identify potential security vulnerabilities, threats, and
risks in order to ﬁnd appropriate countermeasures and apply corresponding security
patterns. In this example, we use the threat modeling methodology [8], in which a system
is modeled in a data ﬂow diagram (DFD). When modeling the functional blocks from
the safety pattern (cf. Fig. 3.) in a DFD, a few transitions and extrapolations occur. First,
since threat modeling assumes that attacks happen when data ﬂow from one process
(i.e., a software component that takes input and either produces output or performs an
action) to another, the logic signal ﬂows in the safety pattern need to be translated into
directional data ﬂows according to the software architecture implementing this safety
logic. Therefore, additional components are added such as the “CAN bus” process,
which represents the communication bus in the in-car system. Second, the trust boun
daries need to be deﬁned in the DFD in order to identify attacks originating from data
ﬂows across trust boundaries. As a result, the charging interface is split into two parts:
an in-car charging interface and the corresponding interface at the charging station. The
interface on the charging station is modeled as an external interactor outside the “In-car
system” trust boundary. There can be diﬀerent levels of trust boundaries. In this case,
we assume that attacks can only originate from outside the “In-car system” boundary.
Third, at the system level, security has an inﬂuence on components beyond the scope of
the safety pattern. Since the communication between the primary and monitor channel
and the charging interface goes through the CAN bus, and the powertrain unit is
connected to the same bus, the security of the charging interface also inﬂuences the
security of the powertrain unit. Thus even though the two safety modules cannot be
attacked directly due to the unidirectional data ﬂows, there are risks that an attacker
might use the system charging function to attack the powertrain unit. Figure 4 shows
the modeled architecture in DFD using the Microsoft Threat Modeling Tool.
The security analysis provides a list of threats according to the STRIDE method. In
our case, the threats we identiﬁed are the communications from the external charging
interface to the CAN bus that is responsible for establishing and maintaining commu
nications for charging control. An attacker can use the in-car charging interface as an
entry point by compromising the external charging interface or tampering with the
communications between the interfaces to inject malicious content into the CAN bus.
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Select Security Pattern. One possible solution is to add a security gateway between the
external unit and the internal CAN bus as shown in Fig. 5. The security gateway is a
security pattern that is placed between an unprotected internal network and untrusted
external entities when communication to the outside is inevitable. As a repeatable solu
tion, the security gateway is not limited to the charging interface. It can be applied to
any communication between the CAN bus and untrusted external devices. In general, it
controls the network access to the internal ECUs according to predeﬁned security poli
cies and can also inspect packet content to detect intrusion attempts and anomalies. It
can also serve as an endpoint for secure communication with external entities that
implement network or application level securities. In this way, it adds security protection
and segments the system without fundamentally changing the existing in-car system
architecture.
Fig. 5. Security Gateway as a security pattern (Tool: MS Threat Modeling Tool 2016)
Apply/Instantiate Security Pattern. In Fig. 5, we see the altered architecture with the
Security Gateway module. Beyond the many beneﬁts, a security gateway might intro
duce latency into the communication, which is a subject of safety impact analysis.
4.2.3 Safety and Security Co-engineering Loop
First Safety Pattern Engineering Iteration. With the inputs from previous tasks we
perform a HAZOP analysis to identify potential anomalies in the provision of the service
Fig. 4. Threat modeling of architecture (Tool: MS Threat Modeling Tool 2016)
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controlling the Charging Interface (cf. Table 1). The focus is thus on the changes
performed to the architecture by the security engineers.
Table 1. HAZOP Guideword analysis of the architecture.
Function: Command to the charging interface to stop charging
Guideword Possible causes Possible consequences
Commission – –
Omission The Gateway blocks a
message to stop charging.
Message gets corrupted
The Charging Interface keeps
providing energy to the battery
Early – –
Late The extra processing time
required slows the reaction
time of the components
Battery is charged for a couple
of hundreds of milliseconds
more than required
Value High – –
Value Low – –
Based on the analysis we identiﬁed failure modes Omission and Late as potential
causes of a hazard (cf. Table 1). Other potential failure modes are not relevant for this
scenario. As input from the Security Pattern Engineering phase, we get the information
that the Security Gateway adds a small latency to the communication between the
Charging Interface and the BMS. This small delay can cause a minor amount of extra
charging in the battery which is not a source of hazard.
From the input received from the previous phase, we also discovered that the safety
functions on the charging interface will not suﬃce in the case of a hacker attack. To
tackle this issue a Charging Interface fail-safe device connected to the Monitor channel
was integrated (cf. Fig. 6). Of course, one obvious drawback in this solution is the extra
cost incurred due to extra hardware and installation.
First Security Pattern Engineering Iteration. The changes in the architecture neither
create new vulnerabilities nor jeopardize the current mechanisms already in place. Since
further modiﬁcation of the architecture was not required, the Loop reaches an end. After
ﬁnalization of the safety and security pattern engineering activities, the design can be
reviewed to check whether all applied patterns can co-exist and whether there is no
Fig. 6. Architecture after the ﬁrst Iteration of safety and security co-engineering
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unwanted inﬂuence. While there is a direct review of the design with the applied patterns
after each iteration, a ﬁnal check can ensure the soundness of the design. It was decided
to add the Security Gateway as an additional component in the system, to not only ensure
that safety pattern and the security pattern do not interfere with each other, but also to
support the maintainability of the security solution. Updates to the gateway do not impact
the safety pattern directly.
5 Discussion
The availability of recurring process steps, based on automotive industry standards,
results in faster and cheaper product development while fulﬁlling the need for intangible
product properties, namely safety and security. This means that if, for instance, a safety
(architectural) pattern is selected to address a speciﬁc safety requirement, additional
information and guidance with respect to neuralgic aspects from a security point of view
is needed. These might be subject to further security analyses and the application of an
additional security (architectural) pattern might be warranted. The security pattern, in
turn, can have a safety impact, which is again explicitly speciﬁed.
The decision about which pattern ﬁts best for a speciﬁc system should be analyzed
taking into account the problem to be addressed and the context of the system. Besides,
there are a few trade-oﬀs that one needs to take into consideration when choosing an
architectural pattern, such as costs (e.g. available hardware, development eﬀort) or
standardization. These trade-oﬀs are project speciﬁc can also involve managerial deci
sions.
As stated, safety and security engineering are very closely related disciplines and
their synergy can be fostered when their similarities are recognized and adequate inter
actions are established correctly.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
This paper focused on the selection, combination, and application of safety and security
patterns. The introduction of the Pattern Engineering Lifecycle provided a systematic
way of safety- and security-related pattern engineering process steps to development,
and included already existing work products, such as the results of safety analyses. The
Safety and Security Co-Engineering Loops helped to align these activities systemati
cally. It beneﬁts from tight integration of safety- and security-related process steps,
which requires increased exchange of information between them.
An industrial use case demonstrated the practical realization of our approach: the
architecture of an automotive battery system was described in a semi-formal way,
including identiﬁcation of its main components, physical interconnections, and ﬂows of
information. Within the Safety Pattern Engineering step, the “Monitor-Actuator Pattern”
was selected as an appropriate measure for detecting failures originating from the BMS.
Within the Security Pattern Engineering step, the “Security Gateway Pattern” was
selected to protect the CAN bus from attacks on the Charging Interface. During the
Safety and Security Co-Engineering Loop, the conducted HAZOP analysis identiﬁed
340
additional modiﬁcations to the overall system. As result, a dedicated risk reduction
measure was proposed to enhance the integrity due to combination of the two patterns.
Finally, the complete system was presented after the ﬁrst iteration of the introduced
Safety and Security Co-Engineering Loop.
With the presented approach, we aimed to derive the manifold beneﬁts from patterns
inherent to their nature. This is a mean for accelerating the application of adequate safety
and security co-engineering in the automotive domain. In particular, we showed a way
to remediate the lack of security knowledge and facilitate easier and more informed
integration of these two “separate” yet interfering disciplines. Future work should inves
tigate an advanced model-based tool support for the proposed steps of the approach with
interfaces to existing external tools.
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